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Abstract:
Rappel au désordre: Architectural Aesthetics Between the 
Performative and the sublime.
An increasingly aestheticized society has inevitably changed 
architecture’s role and function. By some enthusiastically embraced 
as a longed-for recognition of architecture’s scenographic, artistic or 
entertaining potentials, this change has also given rise to a scepti-
cism as to the role of slippery aesthetics and a subsequent recall of 
a more decent, tectonic “form-power”. But do architects necessarily 
have to be either uncritically engulfed by aesthetics or the obstinate 
defenders of a decent, but boring, alternative? A constructive answer 
to this question, however, requires a critique of aesthetics as formal 
or normative order, in favor of a performative, view of aesthetics as a 
means to do justice to a ‘disorderly’ world. 
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Introduction
Over the last decades, an increasingly globalized economy 
of symbolic exchange has transformed the presuppositions 
for spatial planning and architectural practice. Even though 
this transformation could be described in exclusively eco-
nomic terms – as the speculation in supply and demand 
– its aesthetic dimension is conspicuous. What we are wit-
nessing is a situation where things and behaviors, forms 
and structures are becoming pure symbolic value. Referred 
to as a generalized aestheticization (Baudrillard and Nouvel 
2002), this process has however not only brought into focus 
the importance of symbolic exchange. It has also given rise 
to a confusion and scepticism as to the role of aesthetics and 
the meaning of aesthetic judgment. 
Within planning and architecture, the responses to this 
conditional change have varied.  On the one hand, the new 
‘state of the art’ has been embraced as a final recognition 
of architecture’s representative and scenographic potentials 
(Venturi, Izenour, Scott-Brown 1972), enthusiastically ex-
plored in the development of “toolkits” for urban innova-
tion (Landry 2000), competitive cultural strategies (Florida 
2002), strategies for city branding, politics of identity or 
place marketing (Patteeuw 2002, Kelley 2005, Hospers 
2005). On the other hand, the response has been one of 
explicit contestation, articulated either as a ‘new urban-
ist’ return to a naturally grounded “civic art” based upon 
common, natural values (Duany, Plater-Zyberk, Alminana, 
2003) or as a rappel a l’ordre (Frampton, 2002); a recall of 
a culturally and tectonically sustainable order, representa-
tive of an undisputable real. Aesthetics has in this context 
acquired a bad reputation as a misdirected discourse of 
empty gestures and promises, which denies the material, 
the grounded, and the social – all that which supposedly 
constitutes the premises for the phenomenon we call ‘ar-
chitecture’. 
These strong reactions reveal an unresolved tension be-
tween aesthetics and the spatial disciplines. What they also 
reveal is the difficulty to spatially and historically situate 
‘the aesthetic’; to grasp the spatial consequences of what 
Marcuse chose to call ‘the aesthetic dimension’ (Marcuse 
1978); or to understand ‘the aesthetic’ not in terms of what 
it is or should be (an order of values, a logic of ‘beauty’) but 
what it leads to, which is a spatial aspect, an orientation, a 
spatially formulated relation to the world.  
The question is whether architecture and architects are 
doomed to an existence either as prey, helplessly engulfed 
by aesthetics, or as saviours, taking on the role as promoters 
of the decent, but boring, alternative. Is it not possible that 
architects, due to their specific spatial sensitivity, could play 
an active role, as agents of an aesthetically conscious change? 
A positive answer to this question, however, requires not 
only a rethinking, but a reorientation of the aesthetics/ar-
chitecture love-hate relationship, which still, more or less 
intentionally, rests upon the confusion concerning the role 
of aesthetics, either as normative order of (symbolic) eleva-
tion or as disinterested spirituality of a similarly elevated 
kind. Spatially, this reorientation requires a shift from verti-
cality to horizontality, from erection to extension, and from 
ideal form to situated performance, thereby uncovering a 
disturbing disorder, potentially constituting ‘the world’ in 
relation to which architecture gains its significance.  
1. Aestheticization Processes
Historically, architecture and urbanism have been regarded 
as aesthetic or even artistic disciplines, sometimes even 
faculties of Fine Art. Nevertheless, ‘aestheticization’ has a 
false ring in many architectural ears. Aestheticization is a 
process of degeneration, implicitly associated with what 
Kenneth Frampton in a recent essay attacks as a “whole-
sale commodification of the environment.” In his attempts 
to rehabilitate an intellectually and politically conscious 
architectural position, Frampton feels obliged to sharply 
condemn an aesthetics that he sees as nothing more than 
a wallet-driven, either populist “architainment” or elitist 
“spectacle of neo-avantgarde kitsch (quasi-radical in form 
but nihilistic in content)” (Frampton 2005). Aesthetici-
zation is the total surrender to the pleasure principle, an 
un-critical de-humanization of mankind, a flattening and 
levelling of any remaining individuality, “a randomized, 
spread-out delirium” (Hayes 2002). 
Such categorical denouncements call for a closer inquiry 
into aesthetics. What does aesthetics stand for today? Is it 
really all that manipulative? Does ‘the aesthetic dimension’ 
automatically disqualify social and spatial concerns or has 
it, on the contrary, been emptied of its original, social and 
cultural relevance? 
According to the dictionary, ‘aesthetic’ is that which is 
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“concerned with beauty or the appreciation of beauty,” and 
similarly, ‘aesthetics’ “the branch of philosophy which deals 
with questions of beauty and artistic taste;”1 a definition 
harmless enough one might think. However, as Jacques 
Rancière points out, aesthetics emerged as a logic of ideal 
or natural taste, a regulation through the idea of mimesis of 
the relation between a human ‘doing’ (poíesis) and the sen-
sual experience (aesthesis) (Rancière 2004/2006). As such, 
aesthetics developed into an archi-aesthetic, an overarching 
logic with a normative function also in relation to other 
poíetic orders, such as that of architecture. 
Another problematizing fact, absent from the encyclo-
paedic explanation, is the historical association between 
aesthetics and modernity, exemplified by Baudelaire’s am-
biguous experience of a vibrant and unstable presentness, 
by the Nietzschean break with traditional forms of repre-
sentation and sociation, by Schiller’s claims for a non-hi-
erarchic sphere of “free play.” This close rapport between 
an emergent modern life and processes of aestheticization 
– embodied by the metropolis – also explains the discom-
fort and resentment, often articulated as a socially con-
cerned anti-modernism, not the least within the field of 
architecture. Aestheticization is in this respect considered 
to have a dissolving effect on architecture as a societal order, 
and rather than opening up for an agitating and creative 
awareness of the arbitrariness of spatial configurations, ar-
chitecture has to a great extent dissociated itself from the 
aesthetic, in search of more solid grounds like the vernacu-
lar, the tectonic, the ethical, or the spiritual.2   
The annoyance with the general aestheticization of so-
ciety may also be understood in terms of a disappointment 
with an aesthetics that does not stick to its enlightening, 
beautifying, and ordering ambition. Instead, the aesthetic 
embraces ‘everything’ and elevates everything to art, slyly 
modifying its pledge into an unreasonable promise of an aes-
thetic revolution that would transform life into art. The only 
effect of such an aestheticization is, according to its critics, 
the obscuring of political (and spatial) conflicts by appeals to 
a spiritual absolute, now represented by High Art.3 
The Baumgartian attempts to define aesthetics as a natu-
ral logic – “a theory of Fine Arts, a minor logic of experi-
ence, the art of cognition, the art of analogous reason, the 
science of sensuous judgment”4 – can, consequently, not be 
understood separate from an emerging urban consciousness 
of divergence, of heterogeneity, and of multiplicity. Already 
initially, aestheticization thus unfolds as an emancipatory 
levelling, a process actively targeting the elevatory element 
of aesthetics. Walter Benjamin described this process as a 
de-auraticization of Fine Art, a general elimination of insti-
tutional halos and taboos; a subsequent de-heroization or 
de-monumentalization also of architecture. Representativ-
ity, as the reference to a real or an origin, is here replaced by 
reproducibility, by a displacing repetition, a mass-mediat-
ed, expressive and continuously re-negotiated in-between, 
manifested in the expansion of the street, the station, or the 
archade, architectural forms allowing for the dream or the 
illusion of the real to settle in space. 
A noteworthy aspect of levelling de-auraticization is its 
radical transgression of distance – especially that between 
objective order and subject. The real aesthete does not need 
to identify herself in relation to a reified world of objects, 
but transforms the Self into a plastic matter of aesthetic 
expression, realizing the Self in many different forms and 
by thousand different ways. In this respect, aestheticization 
unfolds as an awareness also of the mechanisms of subjecti-
vation. In aesthetic terms, subjectivation is neither simply a 
matter of submission to an order, nor a question of identify-
ing the I proper, the unity of the Self, but the formation of 
a relation between a self and an Other. It is in this respect as 
much a desire to enlarge the self, to transgress the limits of 
the self, or as Foucault expressed it, to “invent” the same. It 
is a process that “does not ‘liberate man in his own being’” 
but rather “compels him to face the task of producing him-
self ” (Foucault 1984).  
This self-productive or self-demonstrative dimension of 
aestheticization refers more specifically to aestheticization 
as the immersive flow of images, signs and symbols charac-
teristic of the modern. Associated with Marxist theorizing 
of commodity fetishism, aestheticization is here more or 
less understood as synonymous with the economy of sym-
bolic exchange. The freedom of emergence and reproduc-
tion here coincides with a commercial exchange of dreams 
and desires through advertising, displays, designs and spec-
tacles, entailing a constant de-realizing of reality. An ambig-
uous interplay, aestheticization has by and large been seen 
as an equivalent to the exploitation of natural resources, an 
exhaustion of meaning through superficial embellishment, 
which, furthermore, transforms the architectural object 
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into a hedonistic and escapist phantasm.  
In a way, there is no need to condemn aesthetics, since, 
as Jacques Rancière puts it, “[t]he uneasiness before the aes-
thetic is as old as aesthetics itself ” (Rancière 2004/2006:86). 
Yet, it is its immanent unsettlement that appears as a threat: 
the peculiar and arbitrary correlation that suddenly appears 
between an architectural masterpiece and the expressions 
of the street, or in Rancière’s blunt words: “between the 
artistic sublime and the noise of a water pump” (Rancière 
2004/2006:79);5 a correlation that a simple rejection of aes-
theticization as nothing but semantic ‘furnishing’ or cos-
metic image-production will not help us understand. 
The question is then, whether it is adequate to under-
stand aestheticization simply as the more or less efficiently 
running software of a ‘hardware’ real, or if it entails a more 
radical, operational shift in attitude towards the ‘real.’ Is 
aesthetics simply an instrumental means to produce or in-
vent a surplus value?  And what about this ‘surplus value’; is 
it really nothing but an expressive and shiny lustre with no 
significant purpose at all? 
2. Spatializing Aesthetics – Ending Verticality
An inevitable point of reference in this discussion is the eco-
nomical aspects on aesthetics as formulated by Jean Baudril-
lard (1981, 1983). From an architectural and planning point 
of view, his specific de-auraticization of representational 
space has been regarded as controversial, also by the author 
himself. At times interpreted as an acknowledgement of 
the global economy of signs, at times as a groundbreaking 
critique of a floating post-modernity, Baudrillard’s inter-
rogations of orders of representation nevertheless play an 
important role also for the understanding of architecture.6 
What I would like to discuss here is first and foremost the 
spatial implications of Baudrillardian thinking, his devel-
oping of what could be described as a ‘spatio-aesthetics,’ 
which takes into consideration not only the representative 
production of signs, but also the emergent field of represen-
tational performances and actions. 
In a step-wise un-doing of representionalism, Baudril-
lard de-realizes reality just in order to re-realize it anew. The 
point of departure is his early interrogations of the hidden 
affinities between use-value and exchange value. In Marxist 
analysis, the characteristic of use-value is its “incomparabil-
ity,” its meaning in a specific situation, whereas exchange-
value (as it appears in its most ultimate form as commodity) 
is based upon the possibility to equate it with abstract, social 
production of meaning, which means that it will work as an 
abstract asset, a conductor of status, in a situation of social 
differentiation. However, for Baudrillard, it is crucial to 
point out that, for there to be an exchange-value, it is neces-
sary that the value be grounded in something, i.e. an idea of 
utility, which then works as a “reality principle”, a rational 
or natural referent, or fond (Baudrillard 1981). A specific 
need is in this respect produced by the framework of utility, 
and thus ex-changeable within this system. This leads to 
Baudrillard’s overturning of the direction of signification. 
It is no longer the signified or the referent (the ‘real’), which 
is the ‘ruler’ or the warrant of meaning, but the signifier. An 
apparent devaluation of the system of symbolic exchange, 
this reverse in direction may be compensated for through a 
‘re-auraticization’ or mythologization of the signifier’s sta-
tus as an ideal ‘content/form’.
Why is this important? Which are the consequences? The 
most obvious consequence is that it unveils what Baudril-
lard ironically labels “the magical” (Baudrillard 1981), the 
ingenious forming which bourgeois culture, through nor-
mative aesthetics, tends to enshrine. As form the ideologi-
cal gains an autonomy, an evidence, and a sustainability. It 
materializes a content, which means that it simultaneously 
produces that content and, as form, the potential of receiv-
ing a content – an adequate definition of architecture. 
What it also actualizes is the relational activity or the 
symbolic work behind this formalization – a spatial un-
folding of aesthetics into a “performativity of representa-
tions” (Smith 2005). In Simulations Baudrillard develops 
this spatio-aesthetic idea further, in an interrogation of the 
“divine irreference of images”; whereas representation, as 
a natural system of meaning, starts from the principle of 
equivalence between sign and real, simulation starts “from 
the utopia of this principle” (Baudrillard 1983), the “divine” 
or ‘extra-ordinary’ fact that natural referentiality is a ‘non-
place’. While representation tries to appropriate simulation 
as a ‘false’ representation, simulation instead “envelops the 
whole edifice of representation as itself a simulacrum” (Bau-
drillard 1983).
This idea is further developed in what Baudrillard sees 
as the historical orders of appearances, which he calls coun-
terfeit, production, and simulation. The first of these orders, 
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counterfeit, is the dominant scheme of the period from the 
Renaissance to the industrial revolution. As such, it replaces 
the signifying system of “cruel societies,” societies of strong 
symbolic meaning, where signs function with its full inter-
diction, with no room for interpretation. The counterfeit, 
by contrast, is arbitrary; it does not build upon obligation, 
but upon a nostalgia of natural reference. The counterfeit, 
as a simulacrum of nature, is in this sense a ‘modern’ sign, 
aesthetically inventing its reference, at the same time ‘mask-
ing’ and distorting an underlying, yet still indisputable, ‘au-
thenticity’. 
The second order of simulacra is the order of industrial 
production, where theatricality is replaced by a machinery, 
a robot, a system of (re-)production, no longer representa-
tional and therefore, through the series, masking no more 
than a fundamental absence or loss of ‘reality.’ The conse-
quence is a revaluation of the technique; no longer a pas-
sive, productive force, it becomes a medium, a principle for 
the production of meaning. 
The third stage, finally, the order of simulation, is a total 
cancellation of the very difference between representation 
and real. It marks a step into a hyper-reality, where the series, 
as the repetitive product, is replaced by the module. Rather 
than negatively defined, this could be understood as a situ-
ation where the real eventually returns, now as an embodied 
and present, material and highly manifest ‘modulability,’ a 
coded space of representational agency. 
The decisive point here is subsequently the re-realizing 
of representations and signs as plastic modules, as symbolic 
‘matter,’ as an actuality, which, as British geographer Rich-
ard Smith puts it, is “performed, not pre-formed” (Smith 
2005). Since there is nothing behind, third order simulacra 
have agency in-themselves; they are not the causes or effects 
of actions, but expressive ‘workings’ in and by themselves 
– perpetual tests, samples, agents of a binary sign system 
– tactical, yes, and thus also tactile – dependent upon conti-
guity, upon touch. The order of simulation is not merely an 
order of phantasm, but an order of immediacy, of contact, 
of connectivity. 
 Clearly spelled out in Baudrillard’s non-representational 
aesthetics is thus a step-wise de-construction of the “edifice 
of representation;” the idea of a natural, mimetic ‘archi-
tecture of aesthetics,’ reflecting an authentic spatial order. 
Baudrillard illustrates this with the architectural example 
of Manhattan and the World Trade Center Towers; an ex-
ample of the sign duplicating itself in order to simulate pure 
meaning. “As high as they are [were…], higher than all the 
others, the two towers signify nevertheless the end of verti-
cality” (Baudrillard 1983). This end of verticality is the end 
also of aesthetic value as elevation, as oeuvre, as masterpiece. 
Aesthetics, as ideal erection, is replaced by aestheticization, 
by an ongoing process of inter-referentiality, of propaga-
tion and intermediation.7 However, aestheticization is not 
necessarily simply a successive dissolution of reality into a 
detached flow of images, nor is it an alienating covering 
up for a distressing ‘Nothingness.’ It is also opening onto a 
space of interference, in which the subject acquires a new 
role as expressive and inventive agent, as actor and director. 
Baudrillard is thus not merely representing, explaining, or 
presenting the world, but also provoking us to consider the 
possibility that our own representational actions actually 
generate the world (Smith 2005). 
3. The Sublime, the Performative, and the Aesthetics of 
Disorder 
A spatio-aesthetics such as the one proposed by Baudrillard 
presupposes an entirely different understanding of the pro-
duction of aesthetic value, indirectly calling into question 
not only elevation or verticality, but also its articulation as 
beauty, unity and harmony. Aesthetics is neither a logic of 
sensuous judgment, nor a mimetic law, nor is it an order of 
beauty. Instead, in its de-verticalized form, aesthetics has to 
be understood as a certain kind of non-hierarchic regime 
for dealing with and identifying values. As regime, it is both 
an actualization and continuous regulation of relations and 
reciprocities; horizontalities rather than verticalities. 
In the following, I will discuss two different ways of 
describing this spatial reorientation of aesthetics, both 
of which should have great implications for architectural 
thinking. The first of these concerns the differentiation of 
Fine Art, and the subsequent questioning of the notion of 
beauty as unifying recognition. The second concerns the 
activation of aesthetic experience and a similar questioning 
of the contemplative element in art. 
A point of departure is Kant’s privileging of the aes-
thetic judgment as the sustaining means to make sense of 
any perceptual manifold. When imagination freely com-
bines a manifold of intuition into a formal arrangement, 
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aesthetic pleasure – or beauty – arises, thus reflecting the 
“purposeless purposiveness,”  decisive for our cognitive ap-
prehension. This discovery of a specific kind of formal and 
aesthetic purposiveness – a unifying sensitivity fundamen-
tal to basic cognition – is also what we first and foremost 
associate with Kant. What is often disregarded, however, 
is the fact that from this does not automatically follow that 
only completely unified manifolds count as relevant, or that 
there is only one way of unifying manifolds (Gracyk 1986). 
Even though Kant grounded aesthetic pleasure in a tran-
scendental and intuitive principle of beauty, he also opened 
for the possibility of deviations and complications.  There 
is consequently, besides beauty, a touch of ‘something else;’ 
an unsettled principle of an otherness; a less defined and 
less purposeful potentiality of experience, developed in the 
analytics of the sublime.9  
In idealist aesthetics, the sublime has been interpreted 
as a more violent, immediate, and strong form of beauty.10 
Literally signifying “height” or “loftiness,” it has been un-
derstood as a reinforcement of the principle of elevation, 
associated with the emotionally impressive, the heroic, or 
exaggerated. Articulated in metaphorical terms, as moun-
tainous peaks, eruptive volcanoes, merciless icebergs, or 
other spectacular natural phenomena, the discourse on the 
sublime has constituted a monumentalism with moralizing 
undertones. As a result, the sublime has been crossed out 
from the spatial agenda as a politically compromised form 
of megalomania. 
However, the sublime has also been interpreted differ-
ently. Derived from an antique tract of rhetoric, the term 
was imported into the emergent aesthetic discourse. In the 
original text by Longinus, the sublime (in Greek hypsous) 
referred to the expressive and unpredictable turns of dis-
course; a linguistic ability not aiming at convincing but at 
bringing about the open, active and, above all, relational 
state of enthusiasm. An important aspect of an orally per-
formed aesthetics, the sublime designated not only the hy-
perbolic, exaggerated, or elevated, but also the transient and 
less grandiose stylistic figures of amplification or gradual in-
tensification, like rings of water reinforcing the outreaching 
and moving effect. 
It is also as expressive and outreaching stroke that the 
sublime re-enters the aesthetic discourse. In Jean-François 
Lyotard’s critique of idealisms of all kinds, the sublime ap-
pears as the transient, widening and dislocational aspect 
of the modern human being (Lyotard 1984, 1986). In fact, 
Lyotard goes so far as to say that “perhaps [the sublime is] the 
only mode of artistic sensibility to characterize the modern” 
(Lyotard 1984). Actualizing both the cognitive restlessness of 
the subject and its more concrete Formlosigkeit (Kant KU:§ 
27), Lyotard brings the aesthetic experience down to an 
open-ended but striking and generative level of an “I don’t 
know what” (Lyotard 1988:12), to the everyday level of the 
unexpected encounter, where a fundamental un-finish opens 
up; an apparent lack of form and finalized order which ulti-
mately threatens also the elementa of architecture.
Rather than a strike from above, the notion of the sublime 
describes an up-front confrontation with the World; a hori-
zontal encounter, discomforting and agitated rather than 
contemplative and pleasurable. While beauty facilitates re-
cognition of the manifold in relation to a harmonized ideal, 
the sublime agitates a fundamental insufficiency calling for 
interaction with the ‘raw’ realm of Otherness. While beauty 
is directed towards higher spheres, the sublime is directed 
toward the outside, negotiating the occurrences of a World 
that is always only ‘fair enough.’11  
The reorientation of aesthetics staged through the no-
tion of the sublime is thus a reorientation towards the out-
side, towards that which is something other than itself. 
Through the sublime, an aesthetic aspect emerges which 
is not absolute, but situational; an attempt to do justice to 
that which is different. This shift in orientation renders 
to the aesthetic a relational and ultimately ethical dimen-
sion, grounded not in consensus, but in the un-prejudiced 
encounter with the Other.12  
Turning its back on auratic beauty and ideal form, the 
aesthetics of the sublime opens up a sphere of events, of 
striking difference, of all the singularities and deviating 
phenomena that ‘culture’, as normative aestheticization, 
tends to oppress. In a dialogue with Jean Nouvel, Jean Bau-
drillard also opposes such de-differentiation, which he sees 
in rational modernity and its elimination of the sublime, 
of the “aesthetics of the secret” (Baudrillard and Nouvel 
2002). Oriented towards the outside, towards that which 
is situated outside of ‘culture,’ such an aesthetics presents 
also monstrous forms; architecture as monster, as animal, 
as non-cultural interceptions into culture, “those objects 
that have been catapulted into the city from someplace 
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else” (Baudrillard and Nouvel 2002). The first, according to 
Baudrillard, was Centre Beaubourg; an architectural syn-
thesis of total aestheticization, at the same time, a singular, 
historical event, completely opposed to existing symbolic 
orders. 
Apart from this turn towards the sublime, another re-
direction of aesthetics may be discerned. Interpreting the 
hyper-real as an active sphere, as a sphere where representa-
tions and signs are understood first and foremost as plastic 
entities, as ‘matter’ for symbolic agency, as something “per-
formed” rather than “pre-formed”, aesthetics unfolds as the 
regime of such performances and workings, a regime deal-
ing with the continuous stream of micro-events that brings 
different things, phenomena, and people together in co-ex-
istence. Different from the aesthetics of the sublime, which 
fearlessly looks after the un-cultural, the dissensual, the aes-
thetics of the performative is of a modest kind. Its critique 
of idealism is unobtrusive; it claims neither to change the 
world, nor to present emancipating differences. Instead, it 
builds upon the un-remarkable rearrangement of those ob-
jects and images that constitute the common surrounding 
in its present form. It is what Michel de Certeau has called a 
“faire-avec;” a continuous establishing of micro-situations 
that “despite all” hold the potential of modifying postures 
and relations (de Certeau 1980). 
If the radicality inscribed in the aesthetics of the sublime 
attracts philosophers and conceptual architects like Bau-
drillard and Nouvel, the performative attitude is the one 
favored by many contemporary artists and activist archi-
tects, who to a great extent also have chosen to play down 
the sublime element of Dada, Situationist and Fluxus aes-
thetic strategies. Today, individual artists and architects like 
Sophie Calle, Rirkit Tiravanija, Francis Alÿs, or Santiago 
Cirugeda Parejo, collectives like Superflex, Park Fiction, 
BAR (Base for Architecture and Research), Raumlabor, 
and Exyzt,13 all focus on the realization of minor displace-
ments of everyday whereabouts, often presented as ironical 
turns or playful ruses, which, rather than agitating provoca-
tion, aim at tactical intermediations, dealings, transactions. 
Operating through ‘trivializing’, performative aesthetics 
blurs not only the boundaries between familiar and differ-
ent, between here and there, but also between disciplinary 
practices, not the least the boundary between artistic and 
architectural performance. 
While the aesthetics of the sublime can be described in 
terms of differentiation, performative aesthetics is best char-
acterized as a tendency of interceptive propagation. This is 
also the aspect developed by Nicolas Bourriaud through the 
notion of “relational aesthetics.” According to Bourriaud, 
the aesthetic paradigm today has to be understood in rela-
tion to a culture of interaction. In a culture where sociality 
has been replaced by spectacle, the aesthetic unfolds as a 
specific kind of sociability – an immanent, social mobiliza-
tion or counterforce, which at anytime and anyplace can 
recharge space. Bourriaud furthermore associates this new 
paradigm with the city as the historical setting that “has 
ushered in and spread the hands-on experience” of socia-
bility. The city is no longer an institutional structure to be 
walked through, but “a period of time to be lived through” 
(Bourriaud 2002). 
Emphasizing “social interstices,” the relational aesthet-
ics of Bourriaud shows not only ethical ambitions, but 
presents itself as an “ethical-aesthetics,” entirely oriented 
towards the public. With notions like “inhabitation”, “co-
habitation” and “co-existence,” the ethical is further un-
derlined. German philosopher Wolfgang Welsch has de-
veloped similar ideas. In a thorough “un-doing” of idealist 
aesthetics he has coined the neologism aesthet/hics  (Wel-
sch 1997:60-77). A contraction of ‘aesthetics’ and ‘ethics,’ 
this notion is “meant to designate those parts of aesthet-
ics which of themselves contain ethical elements” (Welsch 
1997:61). As recombinant concept, the aesthet/hical pro-
poses a dissolution of elevatory aesthetics, re-directing it 
towards a heterogeneity of form, constantly acted out. 
“Aesthetic work,” he claims, “instead of exercising domin-
ion, has to follow the ‘singular impulses’ and attempt to do 
them justice”(Welsch 1997:70).  
This might seem to tie in also with the aesthetico-politics 
of Jacques Rancière, who in his writings has defined the po-
litical as a demonstrative process of subjectivation, a logic of 
‘the Other,’ an idiomatic practice, directly associated with 
the “free emergence” upon which the aesthetic rests. How-
ever, while theoreticians like Bourriaud and Welsch take 
pains in legitimizing aesthetics as ‘the new ethics,’ Rancière 
points out what he sees as decisive differences. ‘The aesthet-
ic’ is not a sphere where you feel ‘at ease’. On the contrary; 
it is a surrounding of discomfort and confusion. Yet, this 
agitated state is what renders to aesthetics its significance. 
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According to Rancière, “[a]esthetics is the thinking of the 
new disorder” (Rancière 2006:88); a regime for subjectiva-
tion with the departure in this new disorder. When aesthet-
ics emerges as a notion, writes Rancière, the idea of a social 
‘nature,’ of a natural ethical order, disappears. Instead, what 
makes aesthetics a political praxis, and vice versa, is its inter-
section in ethical indistinction, in the acknowledgement of 
dissensus. Whereas the ethical presupposes consensus and 
thus replaces political praxis, aesthetics and politics in con-
stitute two alternative and dynamically interrelated forms 
of sharing a non-finalized, sensuous space,.  
In Rancière’s thinking, the association aesthetics-politics 
constitutes a dynamic horizontality, where singular emer-
gencies and modest dislocations both play an important, 
differentiating and actualizing role. On the one hand, aes-
thetics embraces the idea of the sublime, of radical Oth-
erness and expressive potentiality upholding a difference 
between art and life; on the other hand it also includes the 
idea of a revolutionized everyday, where art and life unite 
through a multiplicity of horizontal performativity. 
4. Recalling Disorder, Drifting Towards the Unfinished 
There is within contemporary architecture and urbanist 
practice an ambiguous relation to aesthetics in general and 
to the radical process of aestheticization in particular. On the 
one hand, there is an affirmative stance, a kind of wholesale 
embracement of aestheticization, providing a new role for 
the spatial practitioner as the tastemaker in command; with 
Michael Sorkin’s critical words “the ultimate agent of brand” 
(Sorkin 2002). Naively and short-sightedly capitalizing on 
a thoroughly aestheticized economy, this recast ultimately 
runs the risk of emptying itself, leading to an-aestheticization, 
or total de-differentiation of a diverse and socially complex 
exteriority. Associated with this risk, aestheticization has also 
given rise to an almost allergic reaction, a categorical rejec-
tion of aesthetics altogether and a recall of a socially respon-
sible form-follows-function formula. A value with appeal to 
harmonious order, the functionalist credo is, however, often 
grounded in an ethics, often merely an excuse for the devel-
oping of a de-politicized aesthetics  of ‘beautification.’ 
When Kenneth Frampton rhetorically asks where the 
“anachronistic culture of architecture [is] to situate itself in 
the face of all this […] dematerialized representation and 
misrepresentation” (Frampton 2005), he expresses a quite 
common resignation as to the progressive potentials of aes-
theticization, proposing instead a “rappel” to an ethico-ar-
chitectonic order. Yet, as a process by and large defining 
a contemporary situation, aestheticization should not be 
unconditionally dismissed. Instead, what is required is the 
development of a greater awareness and extended under-
standing of aesthetics, and this beyond the naturalized ‘use-
values’ of beauty, harmony, and unity. 
Recalling the disorderly aspects of aestheticization is in 
this respect not the same as reducing aesthetics to a mat-
ter of taste or brand. Nor is it a total an-aestheticization, 
relativization or dis-enchantment of a diverse exteriority. 
Instead, it entails what in this paper I have tried to outline 
as an engagement with a paradoxical World on an ‘equal’ 
basis, as a spatially staged encounter. Rather than defining 
aestheticization exclusively in terms of a detached flow of 
signs, I have tried to associate this process with the explor-
atory and performative project of a continuously expanded, 
out-reaching Self. As exemplified through the transgressive 
principle of the sublime, as well as through unpretentious 
and humble interference, aestheticization has to be un-
derstood as a relational and political process, an expressive 
questioning of all sorts of supremacy. 
Broadening aesthetics, allowing it to emerge as difference 
and proliferate as life, therefore also means actualizing a de-
sirable ‘more,’ a yet negotiable ‘I don’t know what;’ with Ran-
cières words “confronting the world with what it could be” 
(Rancière 2006:117). It is an aesthetics of interstice that fur-
thermore activates the gap between what has been referred to 
as ‘post-criticality’ and ‘utopian realism;’14 an aesthetics that 
neither gives way to totalitarian nihilism nor to ethical totali-
tarianism. Such a spatially complex and disordered aesthetics 
also creates special possibilities for architecture and architects 
as navigators, editors, facilitators, and interceptors, continu-
ously exploring the trans-disciplinary fields of societal inves-
tigation, from different perspectives embracing the complex 
realm where spatial agency, desire and power intersect.
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NOTES
1 The Oxford Dictionary of English (2005), 2nd revised edition, Ox-
ford University Press.
2 For a discussion, see Jorge Otero Pailos (2002) who in a critical 
historiographical study tries to follow in the steps of what he 
calls the “anti-avant-garde” of architecture. Apart from the 
anti-avant-garde, it is of course possible to discern also a neo-
avant-garde of architecture, to a great extent a source of inspi-
ration for this paper. Emanating from Nietzsche’s critique of 
Hegelian idealist ‘architectonics,’ this ‘negative’ architectonic 
tradition is closely interrelated with surrealist, situationist and 
de-constructivist spatial practices, all in different ways inter-
rogating representational orders. Within an architectural dis-
course theoretically articulated  by among others Manfredo 
Tafuri, Massimo Cacciari, Ignasi de Sola-Morales, John Ra-
jchman or Beatrice Colomina, this train of thought also pres-
ents what I here describe in terms of a spatial re-orientation 
of idealizing aesthetics. See also my discussion of this topic 
in Maria Hellström (2006), Steal This Place: The Aesthetics of 
Tactical Formlessness and ‘The Free Town of Christiania’”; espe-
cially chapter IV, “The Formlessness of Space.
3 For a discussion, see Otero Pailos (2002), and Welsch (1997). 
4 “Aesthetica (theoría liberalium artium, gnoseología inferior, ars 
pulcre cogitandi, ars analogi rationis, est scientia cognitionis 
sensitivae).” Baumgarten (1750-58), Aesthetica, §1, p.2
5 Rancière is here commenting on a discussion about a passage in 
Stendahl’s Vie d’Henri Brulard, where the protagonist con-
jures up the very first, insignificant sounds that influenced 
him in his childhood: a church bell, a water pump, and a 
neighbor’s flute; a discussion concerning romanticism’s ten-
dency to conflate everyday aesthetic pleasure with aesthetic 
‘philosophizing’, thereby (according to some critics) reducing 
the immediate experience.
6 For a recent example, see Helena Mattsson (2003), Arkitektur och 
konsumtion : Reyner Banham och utbytbarhetens estetik. Stehag: 
Symposion.
7 An illustrious example of the end of verticality is the painting 
Flagrant délit by Madelon Vriesendorp on the cover of the first 
edition of Rem Koolhaas’ Delirious New York, where you see 
two representatives of former verticality (two skyscrapers) in 
horizontal intercourse. 
8 “Die Zweckmäßigkeit kann also ohne Zweck sein;” See Imman-
uel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, I:§ 10. Projekt Gutenberg 
http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/kant/kuk/kukp101.htm. Down-
load date 2006-04-01.
9 In the third critique of Kant, The Analytic of the Sublime occupies 
a modest and ambiguous place.Van der Heeg and Wallenstein 
(1992), like many other Kant interpreters, point to the inher-
ent unbalance and fragmentation of the third Critique, first 
and foremost as expressed in the partition of the text in an 
Analytic of Beauty and an Analytic of the Sublime (Analytik des 
Schönen and Analytik des Erhabenen). See van der Heeg and 
Wallenstein, (1992:55-56). See also the discussion in Hellström 
(2006a), pp. 129-139, where “The Free Town of Christiania” in 
Copenhagen is discussed in terms of a sublime tactics of radi-
cal difference. 
10 sublime, from Lat., sublimis, lofty; from Lat. sub-, up to, and 
limes, lintel. Oxford English Dictionary (1989), 2nd edition, 
Oxford University Press. The notion of the sublime is ascribed 
the pseudonym Longinus, who in the antique manuscript 
Peri Hypsous (On Height or On the Sublime) paradoxically 
enough developed the concept as a means to free art from Art, 
or from the criteria of normative judgement. The manuscript 
of Longinus was translated from Greek by Nicolas Boileau-
Despréaux in 1674 under the title of Traité du Sublime, ou du 
Merveilleux dans le Discours. It was this that inspired Edmund 
Burke to his strictly physiological explanation of beauty and 
the sublime in terms of pleasure and a kind of morally edi-
fying pain.  See Edmund Burke (1757/1998) A Philosophical 
Enquiry into the Origins of our Ideas of the Sublime and the 
Beautiful.
11 Tom Nielsen (2004) discusses a similar approach in terms of 
“the Paradigm of Almost Alright.” See Nielsen (2004:30-32 
and 34-35).
12 The most well-known critique of Lyotard’s envisioning of an 
ethical subject has been delivered by Jürgen Habermas. In his 
view, postmodernism is an illicit aestheticization of knowl-
edge and public discourse as it undermines the legitimacy of 
the ethical/political subject. Against the postmodern disbelief 
of meta-narratives, Habermas “seeks to rehabilitate modern 
reason as a system of procedural rules for achieving consensus 
and agreement among communicating subjects. Insofar as 
postmodernism introduces aesthetic playfulness and subver-
sion into science and politics, he resists it in the name of a 
modernity moving toward completion rather than self-trans-
formation.” See Aylesworth (2005). 
13 Some of these examples are discussed in former articles by the 
author of this paper. See Hellström (2005, 2006b).
14 For a discussion of these concepts, see for example Gómez, Lili-
ana (2005), “Interview with Bernard Tschumi.”
